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Abstract 
The current study aims to investigate the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. 
The study conducted the analysis on 262 non-financial listed firms on the Karachi stock exchange (KSE) for a 
time period of six years (2006-2011). The ownership concentration was measured through the percentage of 
shareholding by largest shareholder, five largest shareholders and ten largest shareholders, whereas firm 
performance was measured through market base performance parameters (Tobin’s Q) and accounting base 
performance parameter (ROA and ROE). The study employed multiple regression models to examine the 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. The results revealed that ownership 
concentration has positive impact on firm performance for both accounting and market base performance 
parameters. The understanding of relationship dynamics of ownership concentration and firm performance helps 
investors and policy makers to better utilize the corporate governance internal control mechanisms for achieving 
the firm’s value maximization objective. 
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1 Introduction 
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has received significant consideration in 
finance literature. The concentration of ownership is considered as the tool for aligning the CEO self-intrinsic 
behavior to reduce the agency conflict and achieve value maximization objective of the firms. Several 
researchers in the last two decades have focused on the relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance to investigate whether the concentration of ownership is successful in achieving value maximum 
objective which yielded inconclusive result (Wang & Shailer, 2015). Although ownership concentration is 
considered as effective governance factor that limits managerial opportunism (Makhija, 2004) because the large 
and undiversified shareholders have both the incentives and the means to restrain the self-serving behaviour of 
managers (Zeckhauser & Pound, 1990). Furthermore, they also have legal rights to appoint well-qualified 
executives and/or dismiss managers involved in self-serving behavior. But studies did not provide empirical 
evidence on the relationship between corporate ownership patterns and firm’s performance around the world (see 
La Porta et al, 2000, for comprehensive survey).  
1.1 Corporate Governance in Pakistan 
The code of corporate governance was originally drafted by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan 
(ICAP) in 1998 which was promulgated with some amendments by the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan (SECP) in 2002. There are two regulatory bodies that are currently overseeing the corporate governance 
in Pakistan namely: the SECP and the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). The SECP started its operations on 1st 
January, 1999 and its prime objective was to regulate the capital market, corporate sector and non-banking 
financial sector of Pakistan, whereas SBP is concerned with the implementation of corporate governance in the 
banking sector of Pakistan.  
The SECP’s has made the compliance with a corporate governance code as the listing requirement for the stock 
exchanges of Pakistan; hence SECP has to ensure compliance of corporate governance in the listed companies. 
There are three stock exchanges in Pakistan namely: Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE 100 index), Lahore Stock 
Exchange (LSE 25 index), and the Islamabad Stock Exchange (ISE 10 index). KSE is largest among the three 
equity market of Pakistan and has 638 listed companies with a total market capitalization of approximately Rs 
3147.6 billion ($ 37 billion) on 31 March 2011(Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2010-2011). KSE has achieved 
phenomenal growth in the last few years, but still equity financing is not preferred because of two reasons: firstly 
a lack of competition in various industries and secondly the family owners do not want to lose their control on 
the companies (Hamid & Kozhich, 2006). Shareholders basic rights of registration are secured by Central 
Depository Company (CDC) as this company electronically maintains the account of ownership for all the listed 
companies. Shareholders can legally demand information regarding the company’s affairs which allows them to 
actively participate in Annual general meeting (AGM). Shareholders elect directors through cumulative voting 
and they can also remove a director through resolution. Shareholders’ approval is mandatory for any major 
corporate asset sale, change in the Article of Association (AOA) or increasing authorized capital (SECP, 2005). 
The ownership structure of Pakistani corporation, is largely concentrated (see table 1 for top 40 companies 
ownership structure) and corporations are mostly controlled by the family (Cheema et al, 2003; Ghani et al, 
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2007) through crossholding and pyramid structuring (Cheema et al, 2003; Hamid & Kozhich, 2006). The 
Pakistan equity market is oriented towards few large companies as only 60 firm holds 80 percent of total market 
capitalization of KSE (Din and Javed, 2012) so the market is relatively shallow (Hamid & Kozhich, 2006). 
Likewise, there was not a single takeover attempt since 1988 till 1998 (Schneper & Guillén, 2004). According to 
study’s calculation Pakistan’s equity market was 21 percent of its GDP in 2010 while a World Bank data source 
has been used for calculation which shows the shallowness of the market.  




% of Top 40 Companies 
    All           Non-Financial 
% of Top 40s Market Capitalisation 
    All                Non-Financial 
Local Private Family- Based    52.5                  59.0    30.2                   29.8 
Government    12.5                  12.0    36.5                   36.8 
Semi Government    22.5                  14.0    16.3                   15.6 
MNCs    12.5                  15.0    17.0                   18.0 
Source: Cheema et al (2003) 
2 Literature Review 
Lins (2003) conducted the cross sectional analysis of the 18 emerging economies and concluded that there is a 
decrease in firm valuation as a result of the cross holding (indirect ownership). He also documented that the 
countries having a lower investor legal protection are better off maintaining the non-executive block holders as 
this will lighten the negative effect of the controlling concentration on the firm valuation. Similarly, Ongore 
(2011) depicted that there is a significant negative relationship between the concentration of ownership and firm 
performance, which was measured through return on assets, return on equity and dividend yield. On the other 
hand, Claessens & Djankov (1999) documented that higher concentration of ownership resulted in higher firm 
profitability and labor productivity in the emerging markets of the Czech Republic. Furthermore, 
Wiwattanakantang (2001) conducted the investigation on the role of the controlling shareholders on the firm 
performance in Thailand. He concluded that controlling shareholders increase the firm performance, which is 
measured through the accounting performance parameters (i.e. ROA and Sale to asset ratio). He further justified 
his result with the argument that his sample contains the firms that do not separate the cash flow rights from 
voting rights, so controlling shareholders have no incentive to apply pressure for expropriation of the minority 
shareholders’ rights. Likewise, Singal & Singal (2011) documented that firms with concentrated ownership have 
better performance that firms with dispersed ownership. Similarly, Isik & Soykan (2013) and Karaca & Ekşi 
(2012) have conducted analysis on Turkish list firms through panel regression models and depicted that 
concentrated ownership has a positive relationship with firm performance. Furthermore, Karaca & Ekşi (2012) 
employed only accounting base performance parameter (ROA) and Isik & Soykan (2013) measured firm 
performance, though both accounting (ROA) and market base performance parameters (Tobin’s Q). On other 
hand, Demsetz & Villalonga (2001), Earle et al (2005), Al-Hussain & Johnson (2009), Najjar (2012), and Al-
Saidi (2013) have depicted that there is no significant relationship between the ownership structure and firm 
performance. 
2.1 Literature on Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in Pakistan 
The study regarding ownership structure and firm performance was conducted by Javed & Iqbal (2008) in which 
they documented that the Pakistan has the concentrated ownership structure and ownership concentration has a 
positive relationship with the firm performance when endogeneity is removed through controlling the firm 
specific variables. Their results showed that ownership concentration is enhanced by market growth opportunity 
and dilute by firm size. Similarly, Khan et al (2011), Azam et al (2011) and Hassan et al (2014) also found a 
positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. Khan et al (2011) conduction 
analysis on the tobacco sector and used only accounting base performance measure (ROA and ROE). Whereas, 
Azam et al (2011) empirically tested the ownership concentration on firm performance in oil and gas sector but 
firm performance was measured through accounting base performance measure only (i.e. ROA, ROE and NPM). 
They documented that ownership concentration has strong and positive impact on the firm performance. On the 
hand, there are few researches (e.g., Ibrahim et al, 2010; Wahla et al, 2012; Yasser, 2015) that found a 
nonsignificant impact of ownership concentration on firm performance in Pakistani context. Ibrahim et al (2010) 
conducted analysis on chemical and pharmaceutical sector and used return on asset (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE) as firm performance measures. Whereas, Wahla et al (2012) used market base performance measure 
(Tobin’s Q) as depend variable on 137 non-financial companies listed on the Karachi stock exchange. 
Furthermore, Yasser (2015) had used both accounting (ROA, ROE and EVA) and market base performance 
(Tobin's Q) measures, but still did not find any relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. Hence, there is no consensus on empirical relationship of ownership concentration and firm 
performance so further analysis is needed to conclude on these mix findings.  
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.17, 2015 
 
202 
3 Data and Research Methodology 
There are total 638 firms listed on the Karachi stock exchange which include 287 financial firms and 351 non-
financial firms. As Mustafa et al (2009) proposed that financial and nonfinancial firms could not be studied 
collectively in corporate governance literature due to the number of reasons (i.e. nature of business, functionality 
of regulators and state, board structure, fiduciary responsibilities and accountability, and management). Hence, 
the current study has considered only non-financial firms and the sample for the study was 351 companies listed 
on KSE. Although, current study employed the census approach for sampling, but the sample for the current 
study was reduced to 262 due to availability of data.  The current study used data for six years (2006-2011) 
which were collected from secondary sources, i.e. firm’s annual reports, Balance Sheet Analysis (BSA), and 
SECP’s data. Annual reports and SECP database were used for collecting ownership concentration. Financial 
performance data were collected from the balance sheet analysis. 
3.1 Multivariate Regression Model 
The study employed three multivariate regression models to determine the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance which are given as follows: 
3.1.1 Model 1 
Use to determine the effect of ownership concentration on ROA: 
 = α + βLSH + β5LSH + β10LSH + βFAge + βFSize + βLEV +  
Where, ROA = Return on asset, α = constant term, LSH= Largest shareholder holder, 5LSH= shareholding of 
largest five owners, 10LSH= shareholding of largest ten owners, AGE= Age of firms, Size= log of total asset, 
LEV= leverage of firms, ε= error term and β = coefficients. 
3.1.2 Model 2 
Use to determine the effect of ownership concentration on ROE: 
 = α + βLSH + β5LSH + β10LSH + βFAage + βSize + βLEV +  
Where, ROE = Return on equity, α = constant term, LSH= Largest shareholder holder, 5LSH= shareholding of 
largest five owners, 10LSH= shareholding of largest ten owners, FAge= Age of firms, Size= log of total asset, 
LEV= leverage of firms, ε= error term and β = coefficients. 
3.1.3 Model 3 
Use to determine the effect of ownership concentration on Tobin’s Q: 
 = α + βLSH + β5LSH + β10LSH + βFAge + βFSize + βLEV +  
Where, TQ = Tobin’s Q, α = constant term, LSH= Largest shareholder holder, 5LSH= shareholding of largest 
five owners, 10LSH= shareholding of largest ten owners, FAge= Firms’ age, FSize= log of total asset, LEV= 
leverage of firms, ε= error term and β = coefficients. 
3.2 Independent Variables  
This study employed ownership concentration as the independent variable. The ownership Concentration is 
measured by percentage of ownership shares (votes) of the largest shareholder (Alimehmeti & Paletta, 2012; 
Denis et al, 1997; Hautz et al, 2013; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), largest five shareholders (Earle et al, 2005) 
and ten largest shareholders (Yasser, 2015).  
3.3 Dependent Variable  
Firm performance is used as the dependent variable for the purpose of this study.  Considering the multi-
dimensionality of firm performance, both accounting and market-based performance measures are employed in 
this study (Barney, 2002; Daily & Johnson, 1997; Hoskisson et al, 1994). Because Daily & Johnson (1997) 
noted that “reliance on multiple performance measures is important, as no one indicator reasonably captures firm 
financial performance”. Therefore, three proxies are used for measure firm performance that includes Returns on 
Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and Tobin’s Q (TQ). 
3.3.1 Return on Assets (ROA)  
 It is measured by dividing firm’s net income by total assets (Kumar, 2004; Silva & Leal, 2006; Tam & Tan, 






This is a measure of how efficiently the assets have been utilized in the production process and reflects the 
performance of the management. Bhagat & Bolton (2008) suggested that on average, higher ROA suggests the 
effective and efficient use of a firm’s assets in maximizing the value of its shareholders’ investments by 
management i.e. internal corporate governance structures. Demsetz & Lehn (1985) suggest that as accounting 
profit, ROA may reflect year-to-year fluctuations in underlying business conditions better than stock market 
rates of return. This is because stock market rates of return reflect expected future developments that may mask 
current fluctuations in business conditions. ROA is also a measure of choice because of its more desirable 
distributional properties and because it is not affected by leverage and other items (Core et al, 2006).  
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3.3.2 Return on Equity (ROE) 
Return on equity is a ratio of operating income to total equity (Ibrahim et al, 2010; Javed & Iqbal, 2008; Kumar, 





ROE is cited frequently as a measure of performance in corporate governance related research. ROE indicates 
management’s effectiveness in generating a return on the funds invested by the common shareholders, to whom 
management is ultimately responsible and accountable. One may argue that ROE is relatively better as it 
measures operating performance from shareholders’ point of view (i.e. interest expense is removed from 
earnings) (Brown & Caylor, 2009). 
3.3.3 Tobin’s Q 
Tobin’s Q is measured by ratio of firm’s market value to its book value book value on a replacement cost basis 
(White et al, 1998). The value of Tobins’s Q is lower than 1 (price less than replacement book value) means that, 
earning of the firm is lower than required rate of return. So it can be explained as every marginal investment of 
single dollar by firm in its assets would generate a future cash flow whose present value is lower than 1$ (White 
et al, 1998).  
Tobin’s	Q	 = 	
MV	of	equity	 + B. V	of	liabilities
Total	Asset
		
3.4 Control Variables 
In this study, the researcher included firm size, firm age and as controlling constructs in the model. The relevant 
items of controlling constructs are derived from past empirical literature. 
3.4.1 Firm Size 
The firm size was measured the taking log of book value of firm assets (Al-Smadi et al, 2013). The rationale is 
that a firm may derive economies of scales from large sized assets to increase productivity and sales (Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985). Thus, the researcher expects firms with larger capital resources were likely to have higher market 
value and vice versa.  
3.4.2 Firm Age 
The firm age was measured by years since firm incorporation (Choi et al, 2012). Firm age is regarded as a 
determinant to influence ownership structure in which older firms may associate with more dispersed ownership 
structure compared to younger firms (Eisenberg et al, 1998).  
3.4.3 Firm Leverage 






The rationale for inclusion of firm leverage as control is that a firm’s leverage may lead to increased in external 
control because creditors would monitor its capital structure more intensively to protect their interests (Chen & 
Joggi, 2000; Hutchinson & Gul, 2004). 
4 Empirical Results and Analysis 
This section provides detail of the empirical results of ownership concentration on firm performance that are 
given as below. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for independent (i.e. LSH, 5LSH, and 10LSH), dependent (i.e. ROA, ROE and Tobin’s 
Q) and control variable (i.e. Firm age, Firm size and firm leverage) is provided in table 2. The descriptive 
statistics reveals that largest shareholder on average owns 33 percent of shares in firms. However, largest five 
shareholders own substantial number of shareholding in firm with average of 65 percent. Similarly, largest ten 
shareholders own 76 percent firm’s shareholding on average. With respect to performance measures, descriptive 
statistics demonstrated that ROA has mean of 5 percent with a standard deviation of 15.90 percent. The 
minimum value is -110.14 percent and the maximum value is 179.42 percent. Furthermore, ROE has minimum 
and maximum value of -197 and 212.04 percent respectively.  The mean value is 12 percent with a standard 
deviation of 42.13 percent. Moreover, Tobin’s Q has a mean value of 20 percent with standard deviation of 42 
percent. The minimum value is -61.8 percent while the maximum value is 102.87 percent. 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
LSH 1834 0.06208 0.97864 0.3309 0.19143 
5LSH 1834 0.10084 0.9978 0.65839 0.19287 
10LSH 1834 0.60735 0.99998 0.766 0.16849 
ROA 1834 -110.14 179.4 5.00838 15.9047 
ROE 1834 -197.36 212.04 12.0096 42.1383 
TQ 1834 -61.871 102.878 20.6923 48.4839 
LEV 1834 0.4649 382.584 1.83623 18.7114 
FAge 1834 2 58 18.4193 12.8925 
FSize 1834 1 8.59621 6.28423 0.79794 
 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
The study has three independent variables of ownership concentration which includes: largest shareholder 
(LSH), the largest five shareholders (Five LSH), and ten largest shareholders (Ten LSH). Pearson correlation 
coefficients matrix (see table 3) shows number of significant associations among dependent (ROA, ROE and 
Tobin’s Q) and independent variables (LSH, Five LSH, and Ten LSH). Such as ROA has significant positive 
association with LSH (0.1755) and, Five LSH (0.0867), whereas ROE has strong positive relationship with all 
the ownership concentration indicators (i.e. LSH (0.2928), Five LSH (0.2697) and Ten LSH (0.3842). Similarly 
Tobin’s Q is also positively correlated with LSH (0.2752), Five LSH (0.2317) and Ten LSH (0.2077). However, 
there are weak and statistically non-signigicant correlation between ROA and Ten LSH (0.0317). 
In regards to control variables, it was depicted that ROA has a significant positive correlations coefficient for 
firm size (0.2475) and firm age (0.1387), whereas it is significantly negatively associated with leverage (-
0.2411). On the other hand, ROE is only significantly positively correlated with firm size (0.1224) and firm age 
(0.1126), but it has non-significant correlation coefficient with firm’s leverage (-0.0098). Furthermore, Tobin’s 
Q is significant positive but weakly correlated with firm size (0.0905) and firm age (0.0688), whereas Tobin’s in 
not significantly correlated with firm’s leverage (0.0145). Furthermore, it should be noted that Firm age, the 
control variable, was significantly positively correlated (0.438) with the independent variable (LSH (0.1417)) 
and (10LSH (-0.1202)) while, it was significantly negatively correlated (0.10) with the 5LSH. Nevertheless, 
Firm size was significantly positively correlated (0.1898) with LSH and negatively correlated with 5LSH(-
0.0755). 
Table 7: Correlation Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1) LSH 1 
        
2) 5LSH 0.72** 1 
       
3) 10LSH 0.54** 0.87** 1 
      
4) ROA 0.18** 0.09** 0.03 1 
     
5) ROE 0.29** 0.27** 0.38** 0.46** 1 
    
6) TQ 0.28** 0.231** 0.21** 0.05* 0.11** 1 
   
7) LEV -0.04 0.05* -0.03 -0.24** -0.01 0.02 1 
  
8) FAge 0.14** -0.12** 0.10** 0.14** 0.11** 0.07* -0.06* 1 
 
9) FSize 0.19** -0.08** 0.02 0.25** 0.12** 0.09** -0.22** 0.24** 1 
** sig. at P-value <.01  and *  sig. at P-value <.05 
Number of Observations=1834 
 
4.3 Results of Regression Models 
We began our analysis by assessing the effect of the three basic concentration indicators (LSH, 5LSH, and 
10LSH) on the three firm performance parameters (ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q). Table 4 shows the results of the 
estimation of performance equations for the 262 companies listed on KSE. In respect to ROA, the largest 
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shareholder (LSH) and ten largest shareholder (10LSH) has significant positively relationship (see table 4), 
whereas five largest shareholder (5LSH) has non-significant relationship with ROA. These results implies that 
higher concentration of ownership for largest and ten largest shareholders increase the firm performance, while 
concentration of ownership of five largest shareholder has no influence on firm performance. Furthermore, in 
respect of ROE and Tobin’s Q as performance parameters, results concluded that they are positively related to all 
the three ownership concentration indicators. These results indicated that concentration of ownership increase 
the firm performance for all three ownership concentration indicators. The results of current study are consistent 
with argument proposed by agency theory which proposed that concentration of ownership is used to alleviating 
the principal agent problems, as it gives the owners more power or willingness to monitor the firms’ managers. 
However, these results differ from previous research studies in Pakistan (e.g., Ibrahim et al, 2010; Wahla et al, 
2012; Yasser, 2015). The possible explanation is that the current study used large data set with extend time 
period. As mostly pervious research studies have focus on few sectors (Ibrahim et al, 2010; Wahla et al, 2012) or 
small data set (Yasser, 2015). 
Table 8: Results of Multiple Regression Models 
  
Coefficent t-Statistics Coefficent t-Statistics Coefficent t-Statistics 
(S.E). (P-value) (S.E). (P-value) (S.E). (P-value) 
LSH 
0.10846 3.5 0.738 9.62 0.715 6.87 
(.031) (.000) (.076) (.000) (.104) (.000) 
5LSH 
0.113 1.64 1.40675 11.24 0.43 2.227 
(.069) (.101) (.125) (.000) (.193) (.013) 
10LSH 
0.172 2.67 1.996211 16.9 0.664 3.02 
(.065) (.008) (.118) (.000) (.219) (.003) 
FSize 
3.08541 6.57 5.405715 4.14 3.39 2.15 
(.469) (.600) (1.306) (.000) (1.577) (.032) 
LEV 
-0.1682 -8.81 0.057577 1.08 0.105 1.64 
(.019) (.000) (.053) (.279) (.064) (.100) 
FAge 
0.09044 3.23 0.168223 2.16 0.079 0.84 
(.028) (.001) (.078) (.031) (.094) (.399) 
_cons 
-13.42 -3.88 -301.589 -15.54 -48.5 -4.17 
(-3.46) (.000) (-19.402) (.000) (-11.624) (.000) 
Observation 1834 1834 1834 
R2 0.1258 0.2239 0.0861 
Adjusted R2 0.123 0.2214 0.0831 
F-statistics  13.83 15.15 28.13 
Prob. (F-Stats)  0.001 0.001 0.000 
 
5 Conclusion 
The purpose of this empirical research study is to investigate the relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance for a sample of Pakistan public companies listed on the KSE. The current paper 
contributes to the area of research on an emerging market, the Pakistan capital market. This study would help 
researchers and practitioners alike understand the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance in the Pakistani governance environment. The findings of this empirical study provide the 
importance of ownership concentration as corporate governance internal control mechanism for controlling the 
self-intrinsic behavior of managers. The findings of this study also imply that policy makers should consider the 
characteristics of firms and the nature of ownership structure before they implement new economic reform 
programs. 
Despite the comprehensive effort to cover all aspects of the studied phenomena, but still current study is prone to 
few limitations. Although the study contributes to understanding the impact of ownership concentration on firm 
performance using a sample of Pakistani listed firms, but the impact of other governance mechanism (i.e. 
ownership identity and board characteristic) may enhance the effectiveness of governance and performance 
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models. Thus, the study opened a interesting aspects for future research which may replicate the present study by 
studying the impact of ownership concentration along with other corporate governance internal control 
mechanism. Therefore, future study should include comprehensive model of corporate governance internal 
control mechanism on firm performance to better understand the impact of controlling mechanism of corporate 
governance on firm performance in emerging markets. 
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